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Abstract
Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re given the choice of three
doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick
a door, say No. 1, and the host, who knows what’s behind the doors,
opens another door, say No. 3, which has a goat. He then says to you,
“Do you want to pick door No. 2?” Is it to your advantage to switch
your choice?
The answer is “yes” but the literature offers many reasons why
this is the correct answer. The present paper argues that the most
common reasoning found in introductory statistics texts, depending
on making a number of “obvious” or “natural” assumptions and then
computing a conditional probability, is a classical example of solution
driven science. The best reason to switch is to be found in von Neu-
mann’s minimax theorem from game theory, rather than in Bayes’
theorem.
1 Introduction
In the above abstract to this paper, I reproduced The Monty Hall Problem,
as it was defined by Marilyn vos Savant in her “Ask Marilyn” column in
Parade magazine (p. 16, 9 September 1990). Marilyn’s solution to the prob-
lem posed to her by a correspondent Craig Whitaker sparked a controversy
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which brought the Monty Hall Problem to the attention of the whole world.
Though MHP probably originated in a pair of short letters to the editor in
The American Statistician by biostatistician Steve Selvin (1975a,b), from
1990 on it was public property, and has sparked research and controversy
in mathematical economics and game theory, quantum information theory,
philosophy, psychology, ethology, and other fields, as well as having become
a fixed point in the teaching of elementary statistics and probability.
This has resulted in an enormous literature on MHP. Here I would like to
draw attention to the splendid book by Jason Rosenhouse (2009), which has
a huge reference list and which discusses the pre-history and the post-history
of vos Savant’s problem as well as many variants. My other favourite is
Rosenthal (2008), one of the few papers where a genuine attempt is made to
argue to the layman why MHP has to be solved with conditional probability.
Aside from these two references, the English language wikipedia page on the
Monty Hall Problem, as well as its discussion page, is a rich though every-
changing resource. Much that I write here was learnt from the many editors
of those pages, both allies and enemies in the never ending edit-wars which
plague it.
The battle among wikipedia editors could be described as a battle between
intuitionists versus formalists, or to use other words, between simplists versus
conditionalists. The main question which is endlessly discussed is whether
simple arguments for switching, which typically show that the unconditional
probability that the switching gets the car is 2/3, may be considered rigor-
ous and complete solutions of MHP. The opposing view is that vos Savant’s
question is only properly answered by study of “the” conditional probabil-
ity that the switching gets the car, given the initial choice of door by the
player and door opened by the host. This more sophisticated approach re-
quires making more assumptions, and that leads to the question whether
those supplementary conditions are implicitly implied by vos Savant’s words.
What particularly interests me, however, is that the conditionalists take on
a dogmatic stance: their point of view is put forward as a moral imperative.
This leads to an impasse, and the clouds of dust thrown up by what seems a
religious war conceal what seem to me to be much more interesting, though
more subtle, questions.
My personal opinion on the wikipedia-MHP-wars is that they are fights
about the wrong question. Craig Whitaker, through the voice of Marilyn
vos Savant, asks for an action, not a probability. I think that game theory
gives a more suitable framework in which to represent our ignorance of the
mechanics of the set-up (where the car is hidden) and of the mechanics of
the host’s choice, than subjectivist probability.
Therefore, though Rosenhouse’s book is a wonderful resource, I strongly
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disagree with him, as well as with many other authors, on what the essential
Monty Hall problem is (and that is the main point of this paper). Deciding
unilaterally (Rosenhouse, 2009) that a certain formulation is canonical is
asking for schism. Calling a specific version original (Rosenthal, 2008) is
asking for contradiction. Rosenthal states without any argument at all that
additional assumptions are implicitly contained in vos Savant’s formulation.
Selvin (1975a) did state all those assumptions explicitly but strangely enough
did not use all of them. His second paper Sevin (1975b) gave a new solution
using all his original assumptions but the author does not seem to notice the
difference. At the same time, he quotes with approval a simplist solution of
Monty Hall himself, who sees randomness in the choice of the player rather
than in the actions of the team who prepare the show in advance, and the
quiz-master himself. Vos Savant did not use the full set of assumptions
which others find implicit in her question. Her relatively simple explanation
of why one should switch seems to satisfy everyone except for the writers
of elementary texts in statistics and probability. I have the impression that
words like original, canonical, standard, complete are all used to hide the
paucity of argument of the writer who needs to make that extra assumption
in order to be able to apply the tool which they are particularly fond of,
conditional probability.
One of the most widely cited but possibly least well read papers in MHP
studies is Morgan et al. (1991a), published together with a discussion by Sey-
mann (1991) and a rejoinder Morgan et al. (1991b). Morgan et al. (1991a)
firmly rebuke vos Savant for not solving Whitaker’s problem as they con-
sider should be done, namely by conditional probability. They use only the
assumption that all doors are initially equally likely to hide the car; this as-
sumption is hidden within their calculations. The paper was written during
the peak of public interest and heated emotions about MHP which arose
from vos Savant’s column. It actually contains an unfortunate error which
was only noticed 20 years later by wikipedia editors Hogbin and Nijdam
(2010): if the player puts a non-informative and hence symmetric Bayesian
prior on the host’s bias in opening a door when he has a choice, it will be
equally likely (for the player) that the host will open either door when he has
the opportunity. Morgan et al. (2010) acknowledge the error and also repro-
duce part of Craig Whitaker’s original letter to Marilyn vos Savant whose
wording is even more ambiguous than vos Savant’s.
Rosenhouse (2009), Rosenthal (2005, 2008), Morgan et al. (1991a,b, 2010),
and Selvin (1975b) (but not Selvin, 1975a) solve MHP using elementary con-
ditional probability. In order to do so they are obliged to add mathematical
assumptions to vos Savant’s words, without which the conditional probabil-
ity they are after is not determined. Actually, and I think tellingly, almost
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no author gives any argument at all why we must solve vos Savant’s question
by computing a conditional probability that the other door hides the car,
conditional on which door was first chosen by the player and which opened
by the host.
For whatever reasons, it has become conventional in the elementary statis-
tics literature, where MHP features as an exercise in the chapter on Bayes’
theorem in discrete probability, to take it for granted that the car is initially
hidden “at random”, and the host’s choice, if he is forced to make one, is
“at random” too. Morgan et al. (1991a) are notable in only making the first
assumption. Many writers also have the player’s initial choice “at random”
too. “At random” is a code phrase for what I would prefer to call completely
at random. The student is apparently supposed to make these assumptions
by default, though sometimes they are listed without motivation as if they
are always the right assumptions to make.
In my opinion, this approach to MHP is an example of solution driven
science, and hence an example of bad practise in mathematical modelling.
Taking for granted that unspecified probability distributions must be uniform
or normal, depending on context, is the cause of such disasters as the mis-
carriage of justice concerning the Dutch nurse Lucia de Berk, or the doping
case of the German skater Claudia Pechstein. Of course, MHP does indeed
provide a nice exercise in conditional probability, provided one is willing to
fill in gaps without which conditional probability does not help you answer
the question whether you should stay or switch. Morgan et al. (1991a)’s orig-
inal contribution is to notice the minimal condition under which conditional
probability does give an unequivocal solution.
Precisely because of all these issues, MHP presents a beautiful playground
for learning the art of mathematical modelling. For me, MHP is the problem
of how to build a bridge from vos Savant’s words to a mathematical problem,
solve that problem, and translate the solution back to the real world. If we
use probability as a tool in this enterprise, we are going to have to motivate
probabilistic assumptions. We must also interpret probabilistic conclusions.
Like it or not, the interpretation of probability plays a role, going both
directions.
Real world problems are often brought to a statistician because the person
with the question, for some reason or other, thinks the statistician must be
able to help them. The client has often already left out some complicating
factors, or made some simplifications, which he thinks that the statistician
doesn’t need to know. The first job of the consulting statistician is to find out
what the real question is with which the client is struggling, which may often
be very different from the imaginary statistical problem that the client thinks
he has. The first job of the statistical consultant is to undo the pre-processing
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of the question which his client has done for him.
In mathematical model building we must be careful to distinguish the
parts of the problem statement which are truly determined by the background
real world problem, and parts which represent hidden assumptions of the
client who thinks he needs to enlist the statistician’s aid and therefore has
already pre-processed the original question so as to fit in the client’s picture
of what a statistician can do. The result of a statistical consultation might
often be that the original question posed by the client is reformulated, and
the client goes home, happier, with a valuable answer to a more meaningful
question than the one he brought to the statistician. Maybe this is the real
message which the Monty Hall Problem should be telling us? What if vos
Savant’s opening words had been “Suppose you’re going to be on a game
show tonight. If you make it to the last round, you’ll be given the choice of
three doors...”?
2 The mathematical facts
In this section, I present some elementary mathematical facts, firstly from
probability theory, secondly from game theory. The results are formulated
within a mathematical framework which does not make any assumptions
restricting the scope of the present discussion. Modelling all the various door
choices as random variables does not exclude the case that they are fixed. It
also leaves the question completely open how we think of probability: in a
frequentist or in a Bayesian sense. I impose only the “structural” conditions
on the sequence of choices, or moves, which are universally agreed to be
implied by vos Savant’s story.
2.1 What probability theory tells us
I distinguish four consecutive actions:
1. Host: hiding the car before the show behind one of three doors, Car
2. Player: choosing a door, P1
3. Host: revealing a goat by opening a different door, Goat
4. Player: switching or staying, final choice door P2
The doors are conventionally labelled “1”, “2” and “3”, and we can rep-
resent the door numbers specified by the four actions with random variables
Car, P1, Goat, P2. Since two doors hide goats and one hides a car and the
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host knows the location of the car, he can and will open a door different to
that chosen by the player and revealing a goat. I allow both the location
of the car Car and the initial choice of the player P1 to be random, and as-
sume them to be statistically independent. From different modelling points
of view, we might want to take either of these two variables to be fixed; the
independence assumption is then of course harmless. Given the location of
the car and the door chosen by the player, the host opens a different door
Goat revealing a goat, according to a probability distribution over the two
doors available to him when he has a choice (which includes the case that
he follows some fixed selection rule). Then the player makes his choice P2,
deterministically or according to a probability distribution if he likes, but
in either case only depending on his initial choice and the door opened by
the host. Finally we can see whether he goes home with a car or a goat by
opening his door and revealing his Prize.
The probabilistic structure of the four actions together with the final
result Prize (whether the player goes home with a car or a goat) can be
represented in the graphical model or Bayes net shown in Figure 1. This
diagram (drawn using the gRain package in the statistical package R) was in-
spired by Burns and Wieth (2004) who performed psychological experiments
to test their hypothesis that people fail MHP because of their inability to
internalise the collider principle: conditional on a consequence, formerly in-
dependent causes become correlated. In this case, the initially statistically
independent initial moves Car and P1 of host and player are conditionally
dependent of one another given the door Goat opened by the host.
I now write down three simple propositions, each making in turn a stronger
mathematical assumption, and each in turn giving a better reason for switch-
ing.
Proposition 1. If the player’s initial choice has probability 1/3 to hit the car,
then always switching gives the player the car with (unconditional) probability
2/3 (Monty Hall, as reported by Selvin, 1975b).
Proposition 2. If initially all doors are equally likely to hide the car, then,
given the door initially chosen and the door opened, switching gives the player
the car with conditional probability at least 1/2 (Morgan et al., 1991a).
Consequently, not only does “always switching” give the player the car
with unconditional probability 2/3, but no other strategy gives a higher success
chance.
Proposition 3. If initially all doors are equally likely to hide the car and if
the host is equally likely to open either door when he has a choice, then, given
the door initially chosen and the door opened, switching gives the player the
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Car P1
Goat
P2
Prize
Figure 1: A Graphical Model (Bayes Net) for MHP
car with conditional probability 2/3, whatever door was initially chosen and
which door was opened (Morgan et al., 1991a,b).
Proof.
Prop. 1: This implication is trivial once we observe that a “switcher” wins if
and only if a “stayer” loses.
Prop. 2: We use Bayes’ theorem in the form
posterior odds equals prior odds times likelihood ratio.
The initial odds that the car is behind doors 1, 2 and 3 are 1:1:1. The
posterior odds are therefore proportional to the probabilities that the host
opens Door 3 given the player chose Door 1 and the car is behind Door 1, 2
and 3 respectively. These probabilities are q, 1 and 0 respectively, where
q = Prob( Host opens Door 3 |Player chose Door 1, car is behind same ).
The posterior odds for switching versus staying are therefore 1 : q, so that
staying does not have an advantage over switching, whatever q might be.
Since all doors are initially equally likely to hide the car, the door chosen
by the player hides the car with probability 1/3. The unconditional prob-
ability that switching gives the car is therefore 2/3. By the law of total
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probability, this can be expressed as the sum over all six conditions (door
chosen by player, door opened by host), of the probability of that condi-
tion times the conditional probability that switching gives the car, under the
condition. Each of these conditional probabilities is at least 1/2. The strat-
egy of always switching can’t be beaten, since the success probability of any
other strategy is obtained from the success probability of always switching
by replacing one or more of the conditional probabilities of getting the car
by switching by probabilities which are never larger.
Prop. 3: If all doors are equally likely to hide the car then by independence
of the initial choice of the player and the location of the car, the probability
that the initial choice is correct is 1/3. Hence the unconditional probability
that switching gives the car is 2/3. If the player’s initial choice is uniform
and the two probability distributions involved in the host’s choices are uni-
form, the problem is symmetric with respect to the numbering of the three
doors. Hence the conditional probabilities we are after in Proposition 3 are
all the same, hence by the law of total probability equal to the unconditional
probability that switching gives the car, 2/3.
Proposition 3 also follows from the inspection of the posterior odds com-
puted in the proof of Proposition 2. On taking q = 1/2, the posterior odds
in favour of switching are 2:1 (Morgan et al., 1991a).
In the literature, Proposition 3 is usually proven by explicit computation
or tabulation, i.e., by going back to first principles to compute the conditional
probability in question. For instance, Morgan et al. (1991a) also give this
direct computation, attributing it to Mosteller’s (1965) solution of the Pris-
oner’s dilemma paradox. It is often offered as an example of Bayes’ theorem,
but really is just an illustration of conditional probability via its definition.
On the other hand, Bayes’ theorem in its odds form (which I used to prove
Morgan et al.’s Proposition 2) is a genuine theorem, and offers to my mind
a much more satisying route for those who like to see a computation and
at the same time learn an important concept and a powerful tool. To my
mathematical mind the most elegant proof of Proposition 3 is the argument
by symmetry starting from Proposition 1: the conditional probability is the
same as the unconditional since all the conditional probabilities must be the
same. I learnt this proof from Boris Tsirelson on wikipedia discussion pages,
but it is also to be found in Morgan et al. (1991b).
This proof also supplies one reason why the literature is so confused as
to what constitutes a solution to MHP. One could apply symmetry at the
outset, to argue that we only want an unconditional probability. There is no
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point in conditioning on anything which we can see in advance is irrelevant
to the question at hand.
The pages of wikipedia, as well as a number of papers in the literature, are
the scene of a furious controversy mainly as to whether Proposition 1 and a
proof thereof, or Proposition 3 and a proof thereof, is a “complete and correct
solution to MHP”. These two solutions can be called the simple or popular
or unconditional solution, and the full or complete or conditional solution
respectively. The situation is further complicated by the fact that many
supporters of the popular solution do accept all the symmetry (uniformity)
conditions of Proposition 3, for a variety of reasons. I will come back to this
in the next main section, but first consider a rather different kind of result
which can be obtained within exactly the same general framework as before.
2.2 What game theory tells us
Let us think of the four actions of the previous subsection as two pairs of
moves in a two stage game between the host and the player in which the
player wants to get the car, the host wants to keep it. Von Neumann’s
minimax theorem tells us that there exist a pair of minimax strategies for
player and host, and a value of the game, say p, having the following defining
characteristics. The minimax strategy of the player (minimizes his maximum
chance of losing) guarantees him at least probability p of winning, whatever
the strategy of the host; the minimax stategy of the host (minimizes his
maximum probability of losing) guarantees him at most probability p of
losing. If both player and host play their minimax strategy then indeed the
player will win with probability p.
Proposition 4. The player’s strategy “initial choice uniformly at random,
thereafter switch” and the host’s strategy “hide the car uniformly at random,
open a door uniformly at random when there is a choice” form the minimax
solution of the finite two-person zero-sum game in which the player tries to
maximize his probability of getting the car, the host tries to minimize it. The
value of the game is 2/3.
Proof. We must verify two claims. The first is that whatever strategy is used
by the host, the player’s minimax strategy guarantees the player a success
chance of at least 2/3. The second is that whatever strategy is used by
the player, the host’s minimax strategy prevents the player from achieving a
success chance greater than 2/3.
For the first claim notice that if the player chooses a door uniformly at
random and thereafter switches, he’ll get the car with probability exactly
2/3; that follows from Proposition 1.
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For the second, suppose the host hides the car uniformly at random and
thereafter opens a door uniformly at random when he has a choice. Making
the initial choice of door in any way, and thereafter switching, gives the player
success chance 2/3, and by Proposition 2 (or 3, if you prefer) there is no way
to improve this.
Note that I did not use von Neumann’s theorem in any way to get this
result: I simply made use of the probabilistic results of the previous subsec-
tion.
MHP was brought to the attention of the mathematical economics and
game theory community by a paper of Nalebuff (1987), which contains a
number of game-theoretic or economics choice puzzles. He considered MHP
as an amusing problem with which to while away a few minutes during a
boring seminar. After describing the problem he very briefly reproduced the
short solution corresponding to Proposition 1. He enigmatically drops the
names of Neumann-Morgenstern and Bayes as he ponders why most people
in real life took the wrong decision, but he does not waste any more time on
MHP.
Variants of the MHP in which the host does not always open a door, or
where he might be trying to help you, or might be trying to cheat you, lend
themselves very well to game theoretic study, see wikipedia or Rosenhouse
(2009) for references.
For present purposes, the important point which I think is brought out
by a game theoretic approach is that the player does have two decision mo-
ments. The player has control over his initial choice. Vos Savant describes
the situation at the moment the player must make up his mind whether to
switch or stay, and most, but not all, people will instinctively feel that this is
the only important decision moment. But the player earlier had a chance to
choose any door he liked. Perhaps he would have been wise to think about
what he would do if he did make it to the last round of the show, before
setting off to the TV studio. There is no way he can ask the advice of a
friendly mathematician as he stands on the stage under the dazzling studio
lights while the audience is shouting out conflicting advice.
Van Damme (1995; in Dutch) goes a little deeper into the question of why
real human players did not behave rationally on the Monty Hall show; this
is one of the main questions studied in the psychology, philosophy, artificial
intelligence and animal behaviour literature on MHP. Since “rational expec-
tations” play a fundamental role in modern economic theory, the actual facts
of the real world MHP, where players almost never switched doors, bodes ill
for the application of economic theory to real world economics. The usual
rationale for human rational expectations in economics is that humans learn
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from mistakes. However, the same person did not get to play several times
times in the final round of the Monty Hall show, and apparently no-one kept
a tally of what had happened to previous contestants, so learning simply did
not take place. Nobody thought there would be a point in learning! Instead,
the players used their brains, came to the conclusion that there was no ad-
vantage in switching, and mostly stuck to their original choice. At this point
they do make a rational choice: there would be a much larger emotional loss
to their ego on switching and losing, than on staying and losing. Sticking to
your door demonstrates moral fortitude. Switching is feckless and deserves
punishment.
Interestingly, pigeons (specifically, the Rock Pigeon, Columba Livia, the
pigeon which tourists feed in city squares all over the world) are very good
at learning how to win the Monty Hall game, see Herbranson and Schroeder
(2010). They do not burden their little brains thinking about what to do but
just go ahead and choose. There is a lot of variation in their initial decisions
whether to switch or stay, and observing the results gives them a chance to
learn from the past without thinking at all. Only a very small brain is needed
to learn the optimal strategy. And these birds are evolutionarily speaking
very succesful indeed.
3 Which assumptions?
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 tell us in different ways that switching is a good thing.
Notice that the mathematical conditions made are successively stronger and
the conclusion drawn is successively stronger too. As the conditions get
stronger, the scope of application of the result gets narrower: there are more
assumptions to be justified. From a mathematical point of view none of these
results are stronger than any of the others: they are all strictly different.
The literature on MHP focusses on variants of Proposition 1, and of
Proposition 3. These correspond to what are called the popular or simple
or unconditional solution, and the full or conditional solution to MHP. The
full solution is mainly to be found in introductory probability or statistics
texts, whereas the simple solution is popular just about everywhere else. The
intermediate “Proposition 2” is only occasionally mentioned in the literature.
The full list of conditions in Proposition 3 is often called, at least in the kind
of texts just mentioned, the standard or canonical or original MHP. I will
just refer to them as the conventional supplementary assumptions.
Regarding the word “original”, it is a historical fact that Selvin (1975a)
gave MHP its name, did this in a statistics journal, and wrote down the
conventional full list of uniformity assumptions. He proceeded to compute
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the unconditional probability that switching gives the car by enumeration of
nine equally likely cases, for which he took both the player’s initial choice
and the location of the car as uniform random, and of course independent
of one another. In his second note, Selvin (1975b), he computed the condi-
tional probability using now his full list of assumptions concerning the host’s
behaviour, and fixing the initial choice of the player, but without noting any
conceptual, let alone technical, difference at all with his earlier solution. Of
course, the number “2/3” is the same. In the same note he quotes with
approval from a letter from Monty Hall himself who gave the argument of
Proposition 1: switching gives the car with probability 2/3 because the initial
choice is right with probability 1/3. We know Monty will open a door re-
vealing a goat. Conditioning on an event of probability one does not change
the probability that the initial choice was right.
Thus Selvin set the seeds for subsequent confusion. Let me call his ap-
proach the practical-minded approach:
The right answer to MHP is “2/3”. There are many ways to get
to this answer, and I am not too much concerned how you get
there. As long as you get the right answer 2/3, we’re happy. After
all, the whole point of MHP is that the initial instinct of everyone
hearing the problem is to say “since the host could anyway open
a door showing a goat, his action doesn’t tell me anything. There
are still two doors closed so they still are equally likely to hide
the car. So the probability that switching would give the car is
“1/2”, so I am not going to switch, thank you.
Selvin’s two papers together gave MHP a firm and more or less standard
position in the elementary statistics literature. There is a conventional com-
plete specification of the problem. This enables us to write down a finite
sample space and allocate a probability to every single outcome. Usually the
player’s initial choice is taken, in the light of the other assumptions without
loss of generality, as fixed. All randomness is in the actions of the host, or
in our lack of any knowledge about them. This corresponds to whether the
writer has a frequentist or a subjectivist slant, often not explicitly stated, but
implicit in verbal hints. The question is not primarily “should you switch or
stay?”, but “what is the probability, or your probability, that switching will
give the car?” Typically, as in Selvin’s second, conditional, approach, the
player’s initial choice is already fixed in the problem statement, the host’s
two actions are already seen as completely random, whether because we are
told they are, objectively, or because we are completely ignorant of how they
are made, subjectively. The problem typically features in the chapter which
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introduces conditional probability and Bayes’ theorem in the discrete setting.
Thus the problem is posed by a maths teacher who wants the student to learn
conditional probability. The problem is further reformulated as “what is the
conditional probability that switching will give the car”.
In such a context not much attention is being paid to the meaning of
probability. After all, right now we are just busy getting accustomed to its
calculus. Most of the examples figure playing cards, dice and balls in urns,
and so the probability spaces are usually completely specified (all outcomes
can be enumerated) and mostly they are symmetric, all elementary proba-
bilities are equal. The student is either supposed to “know”, or he is told
explicitly, that the car is initially equally likely to be behind any of the three
doors. The host is supposed to choose at random (shorthand for uniformly,
or completely, at random) when he has a choice. Since these facts are given
or supposed to be guessed, the initial choice of the player is irrelevant, and
we are indeed always told that the player has already picked Door 1.
Well, if MHP is merely an exercise in conditional probability where the
mathematical model is specified in advance by the teacher, then it is clear
how we are to proceed. But I prefer to take a step back and to imagine
you are on a game show. How could we “know” these probabilities? This
is especially important when one has the task of “explaining” MHP to non-
mathematicians and to non-statisticians.
This is where philosophy, or if you prefer, metaphysics, raises its head.
How can one “know” a probability; what does it mean to “know” a proba-
bility?
I am not going to answer those questions. But I am going to compare a
conventional frequentist view – probability is out there in the real world – to a
conventional Bayesian view – probability is in the information which we pos-
sess. I hope to do this neutrally, without taking a dogmatic stance myself. It
is a fact that many amateur users of probability are instinctive subjectivists,
not so many are instinctive frequentists. Let us try to work out where either
instinct would take us. An important thing to realise is: Bayesian probabil-
ities in, Bayesian probabilities out; frequentist in, frequentist out. I will also
emphasize the difference which comes from seeing randomness in the host’s
moves or in the player’s moves, and the difference which comes from seeing
the question as asking for an action, or more passively for a probability.
For a subjectivist (Bayesian) the MHP is very simple indeed. We only
know what we have been told by vos Savant (Whitaker). The wording “say,
Door 1” and “say, Door 3” (my italics) emphasize that we know nothing
about the behaviour of the host, whether in hiding cars or in opening doors.
Knowing nothing, the situation for us is indistinguishable from the situation
in which we had been told in advance that car hiding and door opening was
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actually done using perfect fair randomizers (unbiased dice throws or coin
tosses). Probability is a representation of our uncertain knowledge about the
single instance under consideration. Probability calculus is the unique inter-
nally consistent way to manipulate uncertain knowledge. To start off with,
since we know nothing, we may as well choose our door initially according
to our personal lucky number, so we picked Door 1. Having seen the host
open Door 3, we would now be prepared to bet at odds 2:1 that the car is
behind Door 2. The new situation is indistinguishable for us from a betting
situation with fair odds 2:1 based on a perfect fair randomizer (by which I
simply refer to the kind of situation in which subjectivists and objectivists
tend to agree on the probabilities, even if they think they mean something
quite different).
Does the Bayesian (a subjectivist) need Bayes’ theorem in order to come
to his conclusion? I think the answer is no. For a subjectivist the door num-
bers are irrelevant. The problem is unchanged by renumbering of the doors.
His beliefs about whether the car would be behind the other door in any of
the six situations (door chosen, door opened) would be the same. He has
no need to actively compute the conditional probability in order to confirm
what he already knows. He could use Proposition 3 but is only interested
in Proposition 1. The symmetry argument of my proof of Proposition 3 is
the mathematical expression of his prior knowledge that he may ignore the
door numbers and just compute an unconditional probability. Do you notice
the symmetry in advance and take advantage of it, or just compute away
and notice it afterwards? It doesn’t matter. The answer is 2/3 and it is a
conditional and unconditional probability at the same time.
What is important to realise is that the probability computed by a sub-
jectivist is also a subjective probability. Starting from probabilities which ex-
press prior personal expectations, the probability we have derived expresses
how our prior personal expectations as to the location of the car should
logically be modified on seeing the host open Door 3 and reveal a goat in
response to our choice of Door 1. These probabilities say nothing about what
we would expect to see if the game was repeated many times. We might well
expect to see a systematic bias in the location of the car or the choice of the
host. Our uniform prior distributions express the fact that our prior beliefs
or prior information about such biases are invariant under permutations of
the door numbers.
For a frequentist, MHP is harder – unless the problem has already been
mathematized, and the frequentist has been told that the car is hidden com-
pletely at random and the host chooses completely at random (when he has
a choice) too. Personally, I don’t find this a very realistic scenario. I can
think of one semi-realistic scenario, and that is the scenario proposed by
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Morgan et al. (1991a). Suppose we have inside information that every week,
the car is hidden uniformly at random, in order to make its location totally
unpredictable to all players. However Monty’s choice of door to open, when
he has a choice, is something which goes on in his head at the spur of the
moment. In this situation we may as well let our initial choice of door be
determined by our lucky number, e.g., Door 1. Proposition 2 tells us that not
only is always switching a wise strategy, it tells us that we cannot do better.
No need to worry our heads about what is the conditional probability. It is
never against switching.
There is just one solution which does not require any prior knowledge at
all; instead it requires prior action. Taking our cue from the game theoretic
solution, we realize that the player has two opportunites to act, not one. We
allow ourselves the latitude to reformulate vos Savant’s words as “You are
going to be on a game show...”. We advise vos Savant, or her correspondent
Craig Whitaker, to take fate into his or her own hands. Before the show,
pick your lucky number (1, 2 or 3) by a toss of a fair die. When you make it
to the final round, choose that door and thereafter switch. By Proposition
1 you’ll come home with the car with probability 2/3, and by Proposition 4
that’s the best you can hope for.
Both frequentists and subjectivists will agree that you win the car with
probability 2/3 in this way. They will likely disagree about whether the
conditional probability that you win, given door chosen and door opened, is
also 2/3. I think the frequentist will say that he does not know it since he
doesn’t know anything about the two host actions, while the subjectivist will
say that he does know the conditional probability (and it’s 2/3) for the very
same reason. So what?
4 Conclusion
The Monty Hall Problem offers much more to the student than a mindless
exercise in conditional probability. It also offers a challenging exercise in
mathematical modelling. I notice three important lessons. (1) The more you
assume, the more you can conclude, but the more limited are your conclu-
sions. The honest answer is not one mathematical solution but a range of
solutions. (2) Whether you are a subjectivist or a frequentist affects the ease
with which you might make probabilistic assumptions but simultaneously af-
fects the meaning of the conclusions. (3). Think out of the box. Vos Savant
asks for an action, not for a probability. The player has two decision moments
during the show, not one.
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